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Galgan: The Changing of the Gods

G E R A L D J. G A L G A N

The Changing

of the

Gods1

At the dawn of philosophy, Thales marveled or, perhaps,
despaired: "All things are full of gods."Today, we are living through
the final phase of the centuries-long "changing of the gods":
technology has superseded philosophy; men are playing gods in place
of gods acting as men. My remarks will fall into three areas: first,
ancient philosophy, that is, the bearing of the pagan gods on the birth
of philosophy; second, the development of modern philosophy out of
medieval theological categories, that is, the bearing of the Christian
God on the birth of modern science; third, by way of conclusion, our
contemporary situation, that is, our "problematic" status as "gods
without God."
The Ancient Gods and the Birth of Philosophy
Ancient philosophy began with myth, never entirely losing sight
of nor completely negating this pre-philosophical mode. Stripping
the events occurring in the world of their "becoming" and relocating
them in a supra-temporal framework of universal paradigms and not
singular facts, myth proposes a petrified and sacred "past" which can
be reenacted by virtue of the "secret" knowledge of paradigmatic
events which is imparted to the human race by the race of the gods.
The sacred — which suspends rectilinear time in its ordinariness and
profaneness — exists as a space determined by self-contained being
which is at rest, over against the profane as a degradation of being,
determined by a becoming which is outside of itself. The form of man
which is mortal in the human race is deathless in the race of gods, thus
paradoxically assuring the separateness of the two races: the gods
proceed from "on high," but they are in function of sacred places and
are not all-powerful within nature.
Here we have the germ of Aristotle's philosophical notion of the
"primary differentiation of place" in terms of the "above and the
* This paper was first delivered as part of a Symposium at Sacred Heart
University on "The Catholic Tradition: The Rocky Road to Modernity,"
held on March 25, 1988.

Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 1988

1

Sacred Heart University Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 3

GERALD J. GALGAN

15

below" — the imperfection of change residing in the lower precincts
of the cosmos, in its terrestrial center.1 Here also is the seed of the
bifurcation in the Ptolemaic astronomy of the uppermost, heavenly,
bright points of light and the lowermost, non-luminous sphere of
mud and rock which is the earth. The unity of the cosmos is spatially
articulated and circumscribed, cosmic order manifesting itself in a
series of planes, and its unity filtering downward, with a concomitant
loss of perfection, to the particular things governed by profane,
rectilinear or directional time on earth. Circular motion, epitomized
in the stars, is a tribute paid to the perfection of rest, and the
outermost sphere of the cosmos, wherein is found "the seat of all that
is divine," is a revolving of that which is itself actually at rest.2
This closed, finished, eternal cosmos, a kind of "steady-state"
universe, is the sum-total of being — what Parmenides called the
"all-limited."3 The epistemological primacy is given to what is
known, never to the knower, and although there is nothing above
reason there are particular things beneath the dignity of reason, such
as hair, bones, and clumps of earth. Against the irreducible, irrational
power of fate, which is untouched by reason although it possesses no
power over reason, not even the wills of the gods can prevail, and even
they must struggle and suffer. The gods, after all, represent neither
infinity nor omnipotence, and since the infinite can never be an actual
thing,4 there can be no infinite aspirations for culture, no programmatic attempt to conquer contingent matter.
The nature of man is to bespeak the finite essences of nature: to
be anything less is to be a beast, to be anything more is to be a god. To
construe man as "the measure of all things" is to negate the very
possibility of philosophy as a properly human activity with a morethan-human purpose. As that which is imitated, nature is the
repository of intelligibility, the home of form, and no mere code of
other-than-natural meanings to be deciphered. Not even the race of
gods can interfere from outside with the course of nature, and this
holds as truly at the mythic beginning as at the philosophical twilight
of ancient culture; for although the world becomes for Stoicism a
Cosmopolis, it is a city inhabited in common by two races, gods and
men, which are separated but which require each other's existence.5
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The Christian God and the Birth of Modern Science

The God whose viewpoint is exhibited in Christian faith shows
himself to himself: trinity of persons is the same as one-ness of
essence, so that God as Father generates the Divine Son and shares
the same nature with his absolutely singular Word. As Creator,
however, he wills a multiplicity of words, a world-book which is not
of "one substance" with its speaker; what is created is completely
other than God, and there is nothing divine about the world. To think
Creation ex nihilo, some kind of paradigm is needed where there is
complete dependence of the effect on the cause, and complete
independence of the cause in relation to the effect — a virtually
context-less causality where cause and effect are entirely different
orders of being. Thus God is beyond all substance for Anselm,6 not in
any genus for Aquinas, 7 and is an actual singular for Duns Scotus. 8
Whereas pagan divinity must be with things that are not divine, God,
for Christian belief, would exist in undiminished plenitude even had
there been no world created; this is the God who is not merely
separated from non-divine things in the world but is completely other
than the world itself.
The bridging of the infinite distance between God and man,
which maintains the difference between Creator and creature, is the
life of Christ, which is a mixture of everyday, profane becoming and
the most sublime tragedy, and which overcomes the ancient
dichotomy of the sacred and the profane. Humanity can now assume
a significance completely apart from any relation to a supra-human
race of gods. Instead of the Stoic notion of the world as a city
occupied by two races, gods and men, what is called for is two
radically different cities, one supranaturally, and the other naturally,
founded. The city of God and the city of man thus come to occupy the
place once held by the race of gods and the race of men, and
philosophy can now be informed by the conviction that created being
has a direction, nay, is a temporal direction, and that its Creator is
capable of becoming a creature without losing his uncreated Being.
The world can now be seen to have not only a contingency of
"existence," in the sense that God need not have made a world at all,
but also a contingency of "nature," in the sense that God need not
have made the particular world which he made. The Creator-God
comes to be thought of as freely binding himself by Covenant to
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uphold the particular world he has willed to create, so that a very
un-Greek emphasis can now be put on the inherent singularity of the
world, transformed from a realm that is full of gods to a realm of
imposed lawfulness — no mere spatial totality, but rather the relation
between states of a spatial whole at different times. This unfinished,
created universe, the unity of which is not yet fully experienced,
having been likened to a book, can now be metaphorized
as a machine, and with this we have the emergence of modern science
which assumes that matter can have a real being apart from form and
that the universe is a realm of laws of matter in motion. Devoid of
absolutely privileged upward and downward places, the universe first
proposed by Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo is non-hierarchical,
with a homogeneity of material and process throughout — a universe
where creative activity, both God and man's, is focused on the
particular thing as its terminus ad quern.
The lowliest life, even for a sceptic like Montaigne, houses the
whole of things human, 9 rooted as that particular life is, not in
privileged space, but in the maintenance of unity in opposition
through time. And this is possible because.the very hairs on one's
head are numbered by God, 10 or,, as Leibniz says, because
"individuality involves infinity."11 When the logic of an incarnated
infinite measure is taken out of a purely theological framework and
applied to physical science, the race can be designated, as Descartes
suggests, as the "masters and possessors of nature." 12 Man is now
seen to transcend'nature, by virtue of his having "a man's measure,
that is, an angel's,"13 and human cognition now comes to be
conceived in the way that medieval theology conceived angelic
cognition. Yet, by virtue of his "extended" or "material" being, man
remains subject to the "laws" of nature. There thus emerges the
modern dualism of mind and matter, of the inside and outside of
consciousness, which supersedes the ancient mythic and philosophical
dualism of the upward and the downward in cosmic space. This
supersession is made possible by the medieval theological valorization
of rectilinear temporality in which the temporal "after"can be seen to
be a "making outward" of the intelligibility that was "inward" in the
temporal "before."
The assumption is now that nature, as a code of other-thannatural meanings to be deciphered, has to be modified by the
investigator in order to be genuinely known, so that physical things
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themselves are thought to come under the influence of the human
individual and no longer to operate as they would without that
individual. What can be realized by the individual's own power is now
central, that is, a selfhood which, as first presented by Rousseau, is
not experienced except through itself.14 This further suggests a notion
of theory which no longer relates to the resting place of a
contemplative onlooker but to the work-place of the human subject's
exertion and production. Human subjectivity can now be seen to
modify the sheer externality of space and time, and what is now at
issue is not the love of wisdom, not the speech of philo-sophia, but the
"logos" given to "technique," that is, technology. The displacement of the primacy of philosophy by the primacy of technology
is rooted in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment's proclamation of
limitless possibilities for the perfectibility of a human individuality
which is seen to be the locus of the intelligibility of nature itself.
Thus the human race, in the late modern world, comes to be
conceived as a mortal race of gods, the creator of its own tactics of
living,15 in sharp contrast to the ancient world where the race of
immortal gods both hides from and discloses to men the means of life.
Man as creator makes sense in terms of a co-creatorship with God, as
Augustine himself suggested when he said that men "could be masters
of this world if they were willing to be the sons of God." 16 In this way,
even when modern thought "conceives itself as in the sharpest
possible contradiction to its theological prehistory," as Hans
Blumenberg remarks in his recent study of modern philosophy, "it is
bound to the frame of reference of what it renounces."17 There is a
sense in which late modern culture, as Heidegger puts it, remains
"Christian even when it loses its [Christian] faith."18
Gods Without God
The problematic aspect of the changing of the gods may not lie,
then, in any purported inconsistency of modernity with Christianity.
It may, instead, lie in the attempt of late cultural modernity to remove
all Greek or Hellenic elements from itself. In this way, the essentially
problematic aspect of the completion of the changing of the gods may
lie in the essential powerlessness of late modern thought to know its
own essence as modern and the ground of that essence. The decline of
speculative philosophy, more particularly the decline of an integral
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sense of the contemplative, as the most significant element of our
Hellenic heritage, may be the most significant loss confronting us in
the midst of all that we have gained in modernity. The problem with
the changing of the gods, the loss involved in modernity, may very
well be the loss of the will to understand the more-than-modern
conditions of modernity.
The sign of this loss may be the contemporary epistemological
tendency to construe knowledge as that which is only instrumental
for further knowledge. It is exclusively within the edifice of
knowledge as praxis that the sign is to perform its signifying function,
and the differing vantage points of interpretation are no longer held
to look out upon a world which is common to all perspectives.
There are, in other words, for the young and compassionate
human gods, as many " c i t i e s " as there are interpretive
vantage points, and these cities do not communicate. In this way,
deprived of an intellectual center with which to unify a constantly
increasing body of data, we find, as Cassirer has suggested, that our
interpretive efforts tend to hide an understanding of the meaning of
human being more than they disclose it. I9 What is at issue is no longer
the contemplative "imperial intellect "as Cardinal Newman called it,
but rather the productive "autocratic ego" constituted by endless
consumption of disposable things in a "time scarce" society. Even
knowledge has come to be construed as disposable and as a
commodity — the knowledge industry, the movement of information,
the processing of words.
Given this view, Theoria, with its claim to truth, is effectively
reduced to a species of technology. Truth is now to be understood as a
system of procedures for the production, operation, and circulation
of propositions which are purely instrumental. Trapped in an
epistemic circle where signs can only promote the comprehension of
further signs, and where the whole circle is reducible no longer merely
to the early modern, Baconian assertion that "knowledge is power,"
but to the late modern contention that "power is knowledge,"
the will to search for the ground of being is in danger of being entirely
lost.
The contemporary human race of gods, I submit, is without an
awareness of the importance of the search for the ground, without an
awareness of the primacy of foundational discourse, to the extent
that it has lost sight of the contemplative element in that conjunction
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of the productive and the contemplative that western Christianity
proposed. "But you will have gathered," Nietzsche admitted, "what I
am driving at, namely, that it is still a metaphysical faith upon which
our faith in science rests — that even we seekers after knowledge
today, we godless anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the
flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith
which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is
divine.''720
The conjunction of ancient philosophy and Christian faith here,
for all their differences, is highly significant. Each provided a
metaphysics, each addressed a divine or more-than-human end for
philosophy as a human activity. And if men who have changed into
gods are to examine their essence, its limits, and its ground, then the
conjunction and the differences will have to be drawn into the forum
of speculative philosophy, emergent once again after its eclipse in the
shadow of new gods.
Is it not written in your law, "I said, you are gods?"21
And yet "the Lord your God is God of gods and
Lord of lords . . . ."^
The truly problematic aspect of the changing of the gods is the
failure to think through the implications of "modern philosophy's
developmental incorporation of originally theological categories"23
— the late modern forgetfulness of the ground, of the sense in which
truth is divine. The new gods pursue truth but only as if it were
functional, instrumental, not as having its matrix in the God of their
own godhood. 24 "The only truths that are useful are instruments to be
thrown away," Brother William says, near the close of Umberto Eco's
The Name of the Rose.25 Without a more-than-instrumental conception of truth, the new gods are without God, without the "God of
glory,"26 of whom our medieval tradition spoke.
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